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Abstract: As emissions trading schemes are becoming more popular across the world, accounting has 
to keep up with these new economic developments. The absence of guidance regarding the 
accounting for greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions generated by the withdrawal of IFRIC 3- 
Emission Rights - is the main reason why there is a diversity of accounting practices. This diversity of 
accounting methods makes the financial statements of companies that are taking part in emissions 
trading schemes like EU ETS, difficult to compare. The present paper uses a case study that assumes 
the existence of three entities that have chosen three different accounting methods: the IFRIC 3 cost 
model, the IFRIC 3 revaluation model and the “off balance sheet” approach. This illustrates how the 
choice of an accounting method regarding GHGs emissions influences their interim and annual 
reports through the chances in the companies’ balance sheet and financial results. 
Keywords: accounting for GHGs; sustainability accounting; carbon accounting; IFRIC 3; Emissions 
Trading 
JEL Classification: M41; M48 
 
1. Introduction 
As a result of the Kyoto Protocol, a wide range of emissions trading schemes have 
emerged all around the world. Two types of schemes have been implemented: cap 
& trade schemes and baseline & credit schemes. 
In a cap and trade scheme there is an overall limit to the emissions of all 
participants. An authority, (typically the government in a mandatory cap & trade 
scheme) sets a cap on the emissions (the maximum allowable emissions for all the 
participants in the scheme). It then allocates greenhouse gas emission allowances to 
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the installations that are in the scope of the scheme that are equivalent to the 
previously set emissions cap. Emissions of greenhouse gases are monitored and at 
the end of the compliance period, the participants must surrender a number of 
allowances that are equivalent to their actual emissions. 
The participants in a cap and trade scheme are allowed to trade the allowances. If 
an installation has emitted less than its 
allowances to another organization that has fewer allowances than its GHGs 
emissions. This will constitute an incentive for the operators of the installations 
where it is cheap to decrease emissions to sell the a
the reduction of GHGs emissions is more expensive than to buy the allowances. 
This mechanism enables operators to meet the overall greenhouse gases cap at the 
lowest possible cost. 
The compliance periods are usually set to s
purposes, compliance periods are split into yearly monitoring periods. The phases 
of an emissions trading year in the main cap & trade scheme (EU ETS) are 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. The Emissions Trading Year in a Cap & Trade Scheme (EU ETS)
In a baseline and credit scheme, there is also a cap on the overall emissions of the 
participants. The authority that supervises the scheme (typically the government in 
a mandatory baseline and credit scheme), then allocates baselines to the 
participants, representing the allowable emissions limit for a specific participant. 
Unlike the allowances that are issued in a cap and trade scheme, baselines are not 
tradable. At the end of the compliance period, after the actual emissions are 
verified, the government allocates credits to the participants that have maintained 
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their actual emissions below the allocated baseline. Credits can be traded or can be 
used to offset excess emissions in future compliance periods.  
The participants that have emitted GHGs above their allocated baselines are 
required to surrender credits to cover the excess emissions, a few months after the 
compliance period has ended. The credits can be traded between their allocation 
date and the deadline for surrendering the credits for excess emitters. This makes 
the trading period in a baseline and credit scheme very narrow compared to a cap 
& trade scheme (a few month vs. the whole year). 
Table 1. Emissions Trading Schemes Classification 
 Scheme type 
Cap & trade Baseline and credit 
Scheme 
participation 
Mandatory Mandatory cap & 
trade schemes 
Mandatory baseline and credit 
schemes 
Voluntary Voluntary cap & 
trade schemes 
Voluntary baseline and credit 
schemes 
Source: Based on IFAC (2012) 
Mandatory cap & trade schemes are schemes with compulsory participation. The 
main example of this type of scheme is the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme - EU ETS (EU, 2003, 2004). 
The main example of a voluntary cap & trade scheme is the Chicago Climate 
Exchange (CCX) that was established in 2003 with the aim of reducing the GHGs 
emissions in US. CCX operated two four-year commitment periods (the first one 
between 2003-2006 followed by a second one between 2007 and 2010). The 
Chicago Climate Exchange closed its operations by the end of 2010 due to the lack 
of legislative interest (Smith, 2010). 
The first mandatory baseline and credit scheme was the New South Wales 
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme (GGAS) (IFAC, 2012). GGAS has been 
launched on 1 January 2003 (GGAS, 2011). The scheme ended in 2012 and has 
been replaced by a carbon tax (MRE, 2012). 
The main example of a voluntary baseline and credit scheme is the Clean 
Development Mechanism introduced by the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
2. Accounting Background 
As the upcoming start of the first phase in the EU ETS scheme was closing in, and 
it coincided with the first year of implementation of the IASs for listed companies 
throughout EU, IFRIC was given the task to develop mandatory guidance for 




On 15 May 2003, IFRIC has released the first draft (D1) of IFRIC 3 - Emission 
Rights (IASB, 2003). IFRIC 3 D1 was available on IASB's website during the 
comment period. 40 comment letters were received until the comment deadline 
which ended on 14 July 2003 (IAS Plus, 2012; Zhang-Debreceny, 2010).  
The final version of IFRIC 3 „Emission Rights” was released on 2 December 2004 
(IASB, 2004), with the intention to be effective for annual periods beginning after 
1 March 2005, the first year of the EU Emission Trading Scheme implementation.  
IFRIC 3 considered that, on initial recognition, the emission allowances should be 
recognized as an intangible asset measured at their fair value. The entity should 
follow the recommendations of IAS 38 “Intangible Assets” (IASB, 2012a). If 
acquired for a value that is less than their fair value, a government grant should be 
recognized in accordance with IAS 20 “Accounting for Government Grants and 
Disclosure of Government Assistance” (IASB, 2012b). The government grant 
should be treated as deferred income and should be recognized systematically as 
income over the period for which the emissions allowances were issued. The 
subsequent evaluation of the emissions allowances can be done under either the 
cost or the revaluation model described in IAS 38. The entity should recognize a 
liability, as it emits greenhouse gases, for its obligation to deliver a number of 
allowances equal to the actual emissions. IFRIC has interpreted this liability to be a 
provision as described by IAS 37 “Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and 
Contingent Assets” (IASB, 2012c) as the recognition of the liability requires the 
estimation of the costs (e.g. the present market value of the allowances required to 
cover the actual emissions at the balance sheet date). 
Right from the start, the interpretation has been controversial. In a letter to the 
general director of the European Commission Directorate General for the Internal 
Market, EFRAG (The Technical Expert Group of the European Financial 
Reporting Advisory Group), recommended the EU commission not to adopt IFRIC 
3 (EFRAG, 2005; Deloitte, 2005).  
In the case of an entity that applies the cost model described in IFRIC 3, EFRAG 
was concerned that it would generate a measurement mismatch between the assets 
and liabilities (the emissions allowances at hand are measured at cost and their 
corresponding liability is measured at fair value). This will lead to artificial values 
in the balance sheet of an entity which does not trade these certificates, but is 
affected by changes in the market price of the allowances. 
For an entity that follows the revaluation model described in IFRIC 3, EFRAG 
estimated that it would create a mismatch in the place where the gains and losses 
are presented. This model would not generate a measurement mismatch like the 
one described in the previous paragraph but it introduces a new discrepancy if the 
value of the emissions allowances changes, as revaluation gains are recognized 
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directly in equity (other comprehensive income) while expenses relating to the 
revaluation of the liability are recognized in the profit and loss account. 
Applying IFRIC 3 would also generate a timing mismatch between the moment the 
asset is recognized (when the allowances are obtained – allocated by the 
government or purchased), and the moment when the liability would be recognized 
(as the entity emits GHGs). 
EFRAG has also showed concerns regarding the measurement of the asset (the 
allowances) and liabilities (the provision) that must be continued until the 
settlement of the liability even though the compliance period is over.  
IFRIC has withdrawn IFRIC 3 shortly after it was issued (IASB, 2005). In 
December 2007, IASB has started a new and more comprehensive project called 
Emissions Trading Schemes Project in order to provide guidance on accounting for 
carbon allowances (IFRIC 3 has covered just the accounting of emission rights in a 
cap & trade scheme while the Emissions Trading Schemes Project is taking into 
consideration both cap & trade and baseline & credit schemes with voluntary and 
mandatory participation) (IASB, 2011; FASB, 2010).  
Work on the Emissions Trading Schemes Project has been paused in November 
2010 when, in a joint meeting between the IASB and the FASB the timetable of 
several projects including the Emissions Trading Schemes has been amended 
(IASB, 2011). 
As there is no mandatory guidance for the accounting of the emissions right for an 
entity participating in an emissions trading scheme, since the withdrawal of IFRIC 
3, entities use a variety of accounting approaches (IETA, 2007). 
One of the alternatives to IFRIC 3 is the “net liability” or “off balance sheet” 
approach. An entity that makes use of this accounting method should recognize no 
asset and no deferred income as the emissions allowances are received. The 
allowances are recorded off balance sheet at their nominal value (zero if they are 
received for free). As the allowances are used to counterbalance the liability, no 
balance sheet accounting entries are made if the allowances are enough to cover the 
entities obligations arising from its CO2 emissions. If the entity has a deficit of 
allowances, the entity should recognize a provision measured at the present market 
value of the allowances required to cover its emissions obligation. 
 
3. The Case Study 
The following case study will compare the influence of the accounting approach 
for a company in the scope of an emission trade scheme like EU ETS. The study 
assumes the existence of three entities (Company A, B and C) that have chosen the 




A uses IFRIC 3 cost model, Company B uses IFRIC 3 revaluation model and 
Company C the “off balance sheet” approach) 
In order to preserve the comparability, the case study follows the same example 
used by Cook (Cook, 2009), but adds the “off balance sheet” approach. The 
example also uses the assumptions on which Cook has based his case study: 
• The entities’ financial year coincides with the annual cycle for the 
allocation of allowances and accountability of the emissions, (from January 
to December); 
• The entities’ receive a grant of allowances covering 12,000 metric tonne 
(m.t.) of emissions. 
• The fair value of allowances fluctuates as presented in Table 2. 
• The entity’s expected annual emissions and its actual emissions are 
presented in Table 3. 
• On 31 December the entity buys 500 additional allowances at 11 currency 
units (c.u.) per allowance to cover its liability for the 500 m.t. of excess 
emissions. 
The influence of the accounting model on the companies’ balance sheet is 
presented in Table 4. Table 5 shows the influence of the accounting model on the 
companies’ income statement. 
 
Table 2. The Fluctuation of Allowances Fair Value [c.u. / m.t.] 




10 12 11 11 
Source: The Example Uses the Same Data as Cook (2009) 
 
Table 3. The Entities Estimated and Actual Emissions [m.t.] 
Date: 01 January 30 June 31 December 
Entity’s annual emissions estimations 12,000 12,000 - 
Entity’s actual emissions - 5,500 7,000 
Source: The Example Uses the Same Data as Cook (2009) 
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Table 4. The Influence of the Accounting Model on the Companies’ Balance Sheet 
[c.u.] 
 Company A 
IFRIC 3 cost model 
Company B 
IFRIC 3 revaluation model 
Company C. 
“Off balance sheet” 
approach 
30.06.N 31.12.N 30.06.N+1 30.06.N 31.12.N 30.06.N+1 30.06.N 31.12.N 30.06.N+1 
ASSETS 
Allowances 120,000 125,500 0 144,000 137,500 0 0 5,500 0 
Cash 0 (5,500) (5.500) 0 (5,500) (5,500) 0 (5,500) (5,500) 
Total 120,000 120,000 (5.500) 144,000 132,000 (5,500) 0 0 (5,500) 
LIABILITIES 
Deferred Income 
(Govt. Grant) 65,000 0 0 65,000 0 0 0 0 0 
Emission Liability 66,000 137,500 0 66,000 137,500 0 0 5,500 0 
Total 131,000 137,500 0 131,000 137,500 0 0 5,500 0 
EQUITY 
Other comprehensive 
income 0 0 0 24,000 12,000 12,000    
Current year result (11,000) (17,500) 12,000 (11,000) (17,500) 0 0 (5,500) 0 
Previous year result 0 0 (17,500) 0 0 (17,500) 0 0 (5.500) 
Total (11,000) (17,500) (5,500) 13,000 (5,500) (17,500) 0 (5,500) (5,500) 
Liabilities & Equity 
Total 120,000 120,000 (5,500) 144,000 132,000 (5,500) 0 0 (5,500) 
 
 
Table 5. The Influence of the Accounting Model on the Companies’ Financial Results 
[c.u.] 
 Company A 
IFRIC 3 cost model 
Company B 
IFRIC 3 revaluation model 
Company C. 
“Off balance sheet” 
approach 










0 0 12,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 55,000 120,000 12,000 55,000 120,000 0 0 0 0 
EXPENSES 
Emissions 
cost 66,000 137,500 0 66,000 137,500 0 0 5,500 0 
Total 66,000 137,500 0 66,000 137,500 0 0 5,500 0 
CURRENT YEAR RESULT 
Profit (+)/ 







The balance sheet of company A, that uses IFRIC 3 cost model, shows a 
measurement mismatch between the assets (the emission allowances) and liabilities 
(emission liability) because the emissions allowances are evaluated at cost while  
the emission liability is calculated at the fair value of the allowances required to 
settle it. This leads to artificial values in the balance sheet and income statement of 
Company A which only needed 500 extra emissions allowances valued at 5,500 
c.u., yet its profit is affected by -16,500 c.u. mainly due to changes in the value of 
the allowances. 
Company B has adopted the IFRIC 3 revaluation model. This has created a 
mismatch in the place where the gains and losses generated by the changes in the 
value of the emissions allowances are presented. Allowances revaluation gains are 
recognized in other comprehensive income (equity) while expenses relating to the 
chances in the value of the liability are recognized as income or expenses in the 
profit and loss account. 
Company C results are closer to the effort made to cover the emission liability (the 
purchase of 500 extra emissions allowances at 5,500 c.u.). The main disadvantage 
of the “off balance sheet” method used by this company is that its balance sheet 
hides the company’s exposure to emission allowances market and its potential 
emissions liability. 
The absence of guidance regarding the accounting for GHGs emissions is the main 
reason why there is a diversity of accounting practices, which makes the financial 
statements of large companies, taking part in emissions trading schemes like EU 
ETS, difficult to compare. There are also a lot of concerns about the true and fair 
image and also regarding the understandability, relevance, reliability and 
comparability of the financial information offered by this variety of accounting 
models. 
In a study by Lowel et. al. (2010), he established that the vast majority of the 
enterprises in the EU ETS scheme uses a net model (off balance sheet method) and 
only account for their net position. As Table 4 and 5 shows, this method provides 
the least amount of information on a company exposure to carbon emissions 
regulations and carbon markets based on its financial statements. 
A variant of the off balance sheet method is officially adopted in Romania. This 
provides a partial fix for the issues identified with the application of IFRIC 3’s 
recommendations, but it also suffers from the same deficiencies as the “off balance 
sheet” method. 
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